Well Sheda, it's a good thing there are no "experts on the path to greatness" here.

The notion of leaving readers with "food for thought" in relation to current events is something I can identify with. The relevance of history to current events is regularly discarded; more so by those in positions of power.

Ctesis' figure - of the two at the battle - is indeed the lower. Xenophon's, as I've stated, belongs to fantasy. From my perspective the regular retailing of such figures (including Ctesis') by Helleno-centric sources feeds the disparaging or dismissive (there is a better word somewhere) undertone of the Greek sources with respect to Persia. Vast polyglot armies, ill-trained and forced into the field, are the order of the day. Persia can only have gained such an empire due to the fact that it fields numberless masses and defeats cultures even less worthy than itself. The Persian's subjects are "slaves" to a Great King and, according to Isokrates and his fellow travellers, the Persian himself is an effete individual given to feasting and wasting. The people and its empire are a rotten apple waiting to drop.

The Persians cop a raw deal in much the same way as opponents of the Achaean League cop it from Polybius. It is interesting that, until the ructions of the late 350s / early 340s, the Great King was able to achieve his ends – including the non-negotiable possession of the “Asian Greeks” – by the neatly applied use of fear. The reaction in Sparta to the news of the fleet preparations in the mid 390s is indicative; even more so the immediate recall of Chares by Athens on the threat of Persia supporting the allies in revolt during the Social War.

Without the Greek sources our knowledge would be substantially poorer. It remains the great pity, though, that those sources are strictly Helleno-centric. One pines for an Iranian Thucydides.

Yes, on a less than “physical” plane, the paths of Cyrus and Alexander are linked. On the physical plane they more disparate. Alexander did indeed follow the path from Sardis through the “gates” and into Phoenicia. As you note, he’d other matters to settle after Issos and progressed through the Levant and on to Egypt. As to whether he was committed to an eastern route, I don’t know. In the end that is the path he took and whether it was because he’d intelligence that Darius had left Babylon and began a move to Arbela or because of the reasons Arrian notes is open.

I actually quite enjoyed the piece.

My writings are not usually directed to those "decking the halls of academia," because my purpose is to leave readers with some food for thought that may or may not be applicable to current affairs. I am not as interested in debates over technicalities, because I like to apply history to help modernization of humanity, in general, and Iranian society, in particular. My approach to the "battle of Cunaxa" was no different. I'm thankful Ancient Warfare provided an additional forum to reach more readers. Nevertheless, my writings often cause amusing reactions.

By "agreed-upon" regarding the size of Artaxerxes' army, I meant to say that given Ctesias was an eyewitness too and his figures less ridiculous than Xenophon's then for the purpose of this paper the 400K figure can be agreed-upon as lesser of the two evils. In my opinion, educated guesses are not helpful. If this part in the paper was not as clear as it should have been, it is because I did not focus on it as much as other areas.

As far as routes, it may appear at a glance that Cyrus and Alexander took different routes but in fact they had some important overlaps -- from Sardis thru Celaenae thru Tarsus thru Issus to Myriandrus ... at this point Alexander, who was a foreign invader as opposed to Cyrus, probably had to secure areas which Cyrus did not have to worry about ... then later the two routes overlap again -- Damascus to Thapsacus where Alexander went East to Carrhae for supplies and even then it was uncertain whether he was committed to the eastern route (I believe Cyrus even took a detour to Carrhae for supplies) ... so given Alexander had to make sudden changes based on unexpected variables, obviously the two routes ended up being somewhat different -- additionally by stating Alexander followed Cyrus' path it is to convey that Alexander's invasion itself was not novel -- their paths were the same in a profound sense as well.

Hi Michael,

I'm no expert on the chronology of the uprising in Egypt that broke out some years before Cyrus' march to Cunaxa; but, for what it's worth, there are some musings out there that could reconcile Xenophon's 'eyewitness' description of Egyptian spearmen in that engagement with the fact that their homeland was currently in revolt. In particular, Lindsay Allen in his "The Persian Empire" (2005) notes that its seems to have taken the rebellion of Amyrtaeus until 401 to have affected all of Lower Egypt (p. 104-105). This is based on documents from the key garrison at Elephantine not being dated by the regnal years of Amytaeus until autumn 400 (p. 191). Certainly, this uprising in Egypt (like some in the past) might have still been festering as a low-intensity guerilla insurgency in the delta at the time that Cyrus was launching his campaign and Artaxerxes was gathering a response. If so, he might have felt that drawing a major portion of the Egyptian garrison to his side was justified to meet what was at the moment a greater peril. Jona Lendering in an article ("Amyrtaeus" posted on www.livius.org) has speculated that the withdrawal of a substantial Egypt-based force to defend the throne might even have been the critical mistake that ultimately allowed Amyrtaeus' revolt to succeed. She also suggests an alternative that any native Egyptians removed could have been semi-hostages (more accurately, pulled to remove troops of suspicious loyalty). This latter might also explain why they weren't deployed among the force being gathered elsewhere to address the rebellion. Regardless of issues of loyalty, had they been near-to-hand, these heavy armed soldiers (spearmen with large, wooden shields) would have been just what was needed to counter an army that had a large contingent of hoplites.

Regards,
Fred

Hi Fred,

Each time I write that I seem to have Barney Rubble’s voice echoing in my head! This is not, of course, to suggest that you are Fred Flinstone…

Apologies for the delay – I’ve my head buried in the social reforms of Agis IV and Kleomemes III, not to mention the bias of Polybius when it comes to same and the Aetolians.

Fred E. Ray wrote:
In particular, Lindsay Allen in his "The Persian Empire" (2005) notes that its seems to have taken the rebellion of Amyrtaeus until 401 to have affected all of Lower Egypt (p. 104-105). This is based on documents from the key garrison at Elephantine not being dated by the regnal years of Amytaeus until autumn 400 (p. 191).

I’ve not read Lindsay’s book. Having worked my way through Pierre Briant’s tour de force From Cyrus to Alexander around the time Lindsay’s became available I seemed all “Achaemenided” out!

That evidence is well discussed in Briant’s book (pp 619-20). Amyrtaeus was evidently proclaimed pharaoh in 404 as a document referring to “year 5” of Amyrtaeus is dated 400. On that basis, Lower Egypt had been lost – in most or all. Briant also surmises (correctly I think) that the presence of Abrocomas in Phoenicia, raising an army, is the usual Persian precursor to an invasion of restoration of Persian rule. Cawkwell noted the same with respect to the fleet preparations in the first half of the 390s that so spooked Sparta.

The other matter Briant discusses is the supposed dilatory response of Artaxerxes. Xenophon (and Plutarch) would have it that Artaxerxes was indecisive and not much of a “man”. Hence the whole taken by surprise theme. The somewhat conflicting evidence of Xenophon (Tissaphernes brings the shocking news to the king) and Diodorus (Pharnabazus does this in 404 after bumping off Alcibiades) is reconciled. Diodorus mentions his notice twice. It is the more likely that Tissaphernes, having confirmed the improbable, rides to his King and offers his services and is rewarded with a major command.

Artaxerxes, far from ignoring or totally failing to see the obvious, orders his satraps in Asia Minor to deal with the situation and dissuade his brother from his course. Thus he does not mind that his brother and Tissaphernes are “at war” with one another. Same would go for Orontas (Sardis) who Cyrus says “was given me at first by my father, to be my subject; then, at the bidding, as he himself said, of my brother, this man levied war upon me” (Anab 1.6.6). Evidently Artaxerxes was aware of Cyrus’ army, ambitions and plans.

Fred E. Ray wrote:
Jona Lendering in an article ("Amyrtaeus" posted on www.livius.org) has speculated that the withdrawal of a substantial Egypt-based force to defend the throne might even have been the critical mistake that ultimately allowed Amyrtaeus' revolt to succeed. She also suggests an alternative that any native Egyptians removed could have been semi-hostages (more accurately, pulled to remove troops of suspicious loyalty).

Jasper describes Jona as a “walking, talking encyclopaedia of ancient history” and I think he may well be.

The notion of taking troops of suspect loyalty is often mentioned in regard to the army of the Macedonian conqueror Alexander III. Even though it was in defence of empire I’d think it dangerous to rely on troops whose loyalty must clearly be suspect due to the fact their homeland was in rebellion.

They might well have been there and for the reasons you state. I still think that the key phrase is “these latter being Egyptians, people said”. Xenophon clearly wasn’t certain but, again, “people” might well have been right.

Michael,

Thanks for the good information on the Egyptian rebellion (as well as Jona Lendering's gender - sorry about that Jona!). The idea of pulling troops of questionable loyalty to your side to face a coup attempt does indeed raise a few questions of practicality. I would assume two concepts were at hand: 1) keep potentially traitorous men away from local influences that might push them over the edge and into open revolt, and 2) once put at hazzard on the battlefield, they'll fight (as all soldiers ultimately do) for both their comrades and self-preservation no matter what their political leanings. Of course, if it was the Egyptians that ran first from Clearchus' advance, then the latter is a highly questionable philosophy, since beating a hasty retreat is an excellent way to preserve both your friends and personal well-being.
Again, thanks for your insights!

All the best,
Fred